Abstract. A robust combiner for hash functions takes two candidate implementations and constructs a hash function which is secure as long as at least one of the candidates is secure. So far, hash function combiners only aim at preserving a single property such as collision-resistance or pseudorandomness. However, when hash functions are used in protocols like TLS they are often required to provide several properties simultaneously. We therefore put forward the notion of multi-property preserving combiners, clarify some aspects on different definitions for such combiners, and propose a construction that provably preserves collision resistance, pseudorandomness, "random-oracle-ness", target collision resistance and message authentication according to our strongest notion.
Introduction
Recent attacks on collision-resistant hash functions [17, 19, 18] have raised the question how to achieve constructions that are more tolerant to cryptanalytic results. One approach has been suggested by Herzberg in [11] , where robust combiners have been proposed as a viable strategy for designing less vulnerable hash functions. The classical hash combiner takes two hash functions H 0 , H 1 and combines them into a failure-tolerant function by concatenating the outputs of both functions, such that the combiner is collision resistant as long as at least one of the two functions H 0 or H 1 obeys this property.
However, hash functions are currently used for various tasks that require numerous properties beyond collision resistance, e.g., the HMAC construction [2] based on a keyed hash function is used (amongst others) in the IPSec and TLS protocols as a pseudorandom function and as a MAC. In the standardized protocols RSA-OAEP [5] and RSA-PSS [6] even stronger properties are required for the hash functions (cf. [3, 4] ), prompting Coron et al. [9] to give constructions which propagate the random-oracle property from the compression function to the hash function. A further example for the need of multiple properties is given by Katz and Shin [13] , where collision-resistant pseudorandom functions are required in order to protect authenticated group key exchange protocols against insider attacks.
Our Construction. In this work we show how to build a combiner that provably preserves multiple properties, where we concentrate on the most common properties as proposed in [8] , namely, collision resistance (CR), pseudorandomness (PRF), pseudorandom oracle (PRO), target collision resistance (TCR) and message authentication (MAC).
To explain the underlying idea of our construction it is instructive to recall the bit commitment scheme introduced by Naor [15] . There, the receiver sends a random 3n-bit string t to the committing party who applies a pseudorandom generator to a random n-bit seed r and returns G(r) ⊕ t to commit to 1, or G(r) to commit to 0. Due to the pseudorandomness of the generator's output, the receiver does not learn anything about the committed bit. An ambiguous opening of the commitment by the sender requires to find some r ′ = r such that G(r) = G(r ′ )⊕t. Yet, since there are only 2 2n pairs of seeds for the pseudorandom generator but 2 3n random strings t, the probability that such a seed pair exists is at most 2 −n .
Adopting the approach of Naor we proceed as follows for each hash function H b . First we hash the large message M with H b into a short n-bit "seed" x b . Then we expand this value into a 5n-bit string (similar to the pseudorandom generator). Next, we xor the result with a subset of n random strings t Due to the internal expansion of the short string x b into five hash values, one can use a similar argumentation as in [15] together with the collision-resistance of one of the hash functions to prove that collision-resistance is preserved. At the same time, pseudorandomness is preserved by the final xor-combination of the results of the two hash functions. Moreover, we also show that this construction propagates several other properties, including PRO, TCR and MAC.
Weak vs. Strong Preservation. We prove our construction to be a strongly multiproperty preserving combiner for {CR, PRF, PRO, TCR, MAC}. That is, it suffices that each property is provided by at least one hash function, e.g., if H 0 or H 1 has property MAC, then so does the combiner, independently of the other properties. We also introduce further relaxations of MPP, denoted by weakly MPP and mildly MPP. In the weak case the combiner only inherits a set of multiple properties if they are all provided by at least one hash function (i.e., if there is a strong candidate which has all properties at the same time). Mildly MPP combiners are between strongly MPP and weakly MPP combiners, where all properties are granted, but different hash functions may cover different properties.
Our work then adresses several questions related to the different notions of multi-property preservation. Namely, we show that strongly MPP is indeed strictly stronger than mildly MPP which, in turn, implies weakly MPP (but not vice versa). We finally discuss the case of general tree-based combiners for more than two hash functions built out of combiners for two hash functions, as suggested in a more general setting by Harnik et al. [12] . As part of this result we show that such tree-combiners inherit the weakly and strongly MPP property of two-function combiners, whereas mildly MPP two-function combiners suprisingly do not propagate their security to trees.
Organization. We start by defining the three notions of multi-property preserving combiners and giving definitions of the desired properties in Section 2. In Section 3 we give the construction of our MPP combiner and prove that it achieves the strongest MPP notion. A brief discussion about variations of our construction, e.g., to reduce the key size, conclude this section. Section 4 deals again with the different notions of property preservation by showing the correlations between strongly, mildly and weakly MPP combiners. The issue of composing combiners resp. multi-hash combiners is then addressed in Section 5.
Hash Function Properties
A hash function H = (HKGen, H) is a pair of efficient algorithms such that HKGen for input 1 n returns (the description of) a hash function H, and H for input H and M ∈ {0, 1} * deterministically outputs a digest H(M ) ∈ {0, 1} n . Often, the hash function is also based on a public initial value IV and we therefore occassionally write H(IV, M ) instead of H(M ). Similarly, we often identify the hash function with its digest values H(·) if the key generation algorithm is clear from the context.
A hash function may be attributed different properties P 1 , P 2 , . . . , among which five important ones stand out (cf. [8] ): collision resistance (CR): The hash function is called collision-resistant if for any efficient algorithm A the probability that for H ← HKGen(1 n ) and
, is negligible (as a function of n). pseudorandomness (PRF): A hash function can be used as a pseudorandom function if the inital value IV is replaced by a randomly chosen key K of the same size (i.e., the key generation algorithm outputs a public part (H, IV) and IV is replaced by a secret key K). Such a keyed hash function
is negligible, where the probability in the first case is over D's coin tosses, the choice of H ← HKGen(1 n ) and the key K, and in the second case over D's coin tosses, the choice of H ← HKGen(1 n ), and the choice of the random function f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n . pseudorandom oracle (PRO): A hash function H f based on a random oracle f is called a pseudorandom oracle if for any efficient adversary the construction H f is indifferentiable from a random oracle F, where indifferentiability [14] is a generalization of indistinguishability allowing to consider random oracles that are used as a public component. More formally, a hash function H f is indifferentiable from a random oracle F if for any efficient adversary D there exists an efficient algorithm S such that the advantage
is negligible in n, where the probability in the first case is over D's coin tosses, H ← HKGen(1 n ) and the choice of the random function f , and in the second case over the coin tosses of D and S, and H ← HKGen(1 n ) and over the choice of F. target collision-resistance (TCR): Target collision-resistance is a weaker security notion than collision-resistance which obliges the adversary to first commit to a target message M before getting the description H ← HKGen(1 n ) of the hash function. For the given H the adversary must then find a second message 
, is negligible. message authentication (MAC): We assume again that the intial value is replaced by a secret random key K. We say that the hash function is a secure MAC if for any efficient adversary A the probability that for H ← HKGen(1 n ) and random K and (M, τ ) ← A H(K,·) (H) we have τ = H(K, M ) and M has never been queried to oracle H(K, ·), is negligible.
For a set prop = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P N } of properties we write prop(H) ⊆ prop for the properties which hash function H has.
Multi-Property Preserving Combiners
A hash function combiner C = (CKGen, Comb) for hash functions H 0 , H 1 itself is also a hash function which combines the two functions H 0 , H 1 such that, if at least one of the hash functions obeys property P, then so does the combiner. For multiple properties prop = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P N } one can either demand that the combiner inherits the properties if one of the candidate hash functions is strong and has all the properties (weakly preserving), or that for each property at least one of the two hash functions has the property (strongly preserving). We also consider a notion in between but somewhat closer to the weak case, called mildly preserving, in which case all properties from prop must hold, albeit different functions may cover different properties (instead of one function as in the case of weakly preserving combiners).
2 More formally, Definition 1 (Multi-Property Preservation). For a set prop = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P N } of properties a hash function combiner C = (CKGen, Comb) for hash functions H 0 , H 1 is called weakly multi-property preserving (wMPP) for prop iff
mildly multi-property preserving (mMPP) for prop iff
and strongly multi-property preserving (sMPP) for prop iff for all P i ∈ prop,
We remark that for weak and mild preservation all individual properties P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P N from prop are guaranteed to hold, either by a single function as in weak preservation, or possibly by different functions as in mild preservation. The combiner may therefore depend on some strong property P i ∈ prop which one of the hash functions has, and which helps to implement some other property P j in the combined hash function. But then, for a subset prop ′ ⊆ prop which, for instance, misses this strong property P i , the combiner may no longer preserve the properties prop ′ . This is in contrast to strongly preserving combiners which support such subsets of properties by definition.
Note that for a singleton prop = {P} all notions coincide and we simply say that C is P-preserving in this case. However, for two or more properties the notions become strictly stronger from weak to mild to strong, as we show in Section 4. Finally, we note that our definition allows the case H 0 = H 1 , which may require some care when designing combiners, especially if the hash functions are based on random oracles (see also the remark after Lemma 3).
Constructing Multi-Property Preserving Combiners
In this section we propose our combiner for the properties CR, PRF, PRO, TCR and MAC. We then show it to be strongly multi-property preserving for these properties.
Our Construction
Our combiner for functions
5n . The evaluation algorithm Comb -First hash the large message M into a short string x b ∈ {0, 1} n via the hash function H b . For this step we prepend a 0-bit to M in order to make the hash function evaluation here somewhat independent from the subsequent stages.
-Then expand the short string x b into five hash values h
, where i 3 denotes the number i represented in binary with 3 bits. Concatenate these strings and denote the resulting 5n-bit string by 
Multi-Property Preservation
We next show that the construction satisfies our strongest notion for combiners: Theorem 1. The combiner C sMPP in Section 3.1 is a strongly multi-property preserving combiner for prop = {CR, PRF, PRO, TCR, MAC}.
The theorem is proven in five lemmas, each lemma showing that the combiner preserves one of the properties (as long as at least one hash functions guarantees this property). Since each lemma holds independently of further assumptions, the strong multi-property preservation follows. Lemma 1. The combiner C sMPP is CR-preserving.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that an adversary A Comb on input H 0 , H 1 , T , with noticeable probability, outputs M = M ′ with Comb (1), while the probability (over the random choice of the t i 's) that for such a fixed tuple with
′ ). By assumption, both adversaries A 0 , A 1 find collisions for H 0 and H 1 , respectively, with noticeable probability then.
⊓ ⊔ Lemma 2. The combiner C sMPP is PRF-preserving.
Proof. The combiner Comb

H0,H1,T sMPP
is pseudorandom if the distribution of the combiner's output cannot be distinguished from a truly random function by any polynomial-time adversary. Assume that one of the hash functions H 0 or H 1 is pseudorandom, yet the combiner is not pseudorandom, i.e., there is an adversary D Comb that can distinguish the function Comb H0,H1,T sMPP (K 0 , K 1 , ·) from a random function F with non-negligible probability. We show that this allows to construct a successful distinguisher D b for each underlying hash function H b , which will contradict our initial assumption.
Recall that adversary D Comb has oracle access to a function that is either a random function F : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} 5n or the keyed version of our construction Comb 
If the oracle of D b returns random values using a truly random function f , then the simulated response originates from a structured computation involving f . Yet we claim that the output still looks like a truly random function as long as no collision on the first stage of the construction occurs. With probability at most 2 −n any pair of queries M = M ′ of D Comb yields a collision under f , i.e., such that f (0||M ) = f (0||M ′ ) which implies a collision on the final output of the simulation of H prsrv b
. The probability that any collision among q = q(n) = poly(n) queries of D Comb occurs, is therefore at most Overall, the output distribution of
Hence, the probability that
and thereby not negligible. This contradicts the assumption that either hash function H 0 or H 1 is a pseudorandom function. ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 3. The combiner C sMPP is PRO-preserving.
There is a small caveat here. Our definition of combiners allows to use the same hash function H 0 = H 1 , albeit our combiner samples independent instances of the hash functions then. In this sense, it is understood that, if hash function H 0 is given by a random oracle (as required for property PRO), then in case H 0 = H 1 the other hash function instance uses an independent random oracle. F . We will use the simulator described below:
Simulator S The simulator's goal is to mimic H 0 , i.e., to produce an output that looks consistent to what the distinguisher can obtain from F. To simulate H 0 , the simulator S creates a database, where in addition to the previously processed queries and answers also answers to potential subsequent queries of D are stored. Those additional entries are generated if S receives a new query X = 0||M , that might be an attempt of D to simulate the construction of our combiner with the answers of S. In this case, the simulator first chooses a random answer x 0 . Then S invokes the random oracle F on input M and the black-box function H 1 on input X, where the answer x 1 ← H 1 (X) is used for further queries 1||x 1 || i 3 to H 1 . The responses to those queries correspond to the values h n and stores the value. Except for two events E 1 , E 2 (defined below), the simulator will provide outputs that are consistent with F, such that D cannot distinguish between (Comb H0,H1,T sMPP , H 0 ) and (F, S F ). The first event E 1 is a collision for S with
, that occurs with probability at most q 2 · 2 −n where q denotes the number of queries by D. The second event E 2 occurs if D makes queries to S of the form 1||x 0 || i 3 where x 0 has not been an answer of the simulator before, but on a subsequent query X = 0||M the simulator picks x 0 as its answer. In this case S has already fixed at least one value h 0 i for i = 0, . . . , 4 and cannot later define this value after learning F(M ). In particular, S is then unable to provide a consistent output. But, since S returns random values from {0, 1} n on new queries X, the probability for S(X) = x 0 for any previous query x 0 is at most q · 2 −n , where q is the maximal number of queries of type 1||x 0 || i 3 in D's execution. Overall, event E 2 happens with probability at most q 2 · 2 −n . Given that neither event occurs all replies by S are random (but consistent with the values provided by F). Comparing the two games we note that, for a consistent run, the simulator's random choices and the replies of F to the simulator's queries implicitly define a random function f , where the only difference to the original construction of H prsrv 0 and the "forward" usage of f is that f in the simulation here is defined "backwards" through F. Still, the two experiments look identical from D's viewpoint.
The advantage of the adversary D is thus at most the probability that one of the events E 1 or E 2 happens, i.e., Prob [
Hence, the probability that D can distinguish whether it is communicating with (Comb The proof that our combiner is target collision-resistant follows the argument for collision-resistance closely and appears in the full version.
Lemma 5. The combiner C sMPP is MAC-preserving.
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that our combiner is not a secure MAC. Then there exists an adversary A Comb which, after learning several values τ i = Comb H0,H1,T sMPP For the analysis we consider the two exclusive cases of an successful A Comb . First, the adversary A Comb manages to find a new M and a valid τ such that H b (K b , 0||M ) collides with some value H b (K b , 0||M i ) for some query 0||M i . Given this, adversary A b outputs 0||M and H b (K b , 0||M ) with probability 1 2q , namely, if c = 0 and the guess for i is correct. But then 0||M is distinct from all of A b 's previous queries (because all 0||M i 's are distinct from 0||M and all other queries of A b are prepended by a 1-bit). Hence, if A Comb successfully forges such a MAC with noticeable probability, then so does A b . Put differently, the probability that A Comb succeeds for such cases is negligible by the security of H b .
The second case occurs if A Comb outputs a fresh M and a valid tag τ such that
Note that this requires A b to make a further oracle query about value 0||M . But this value (in addition to all other queries) is different from 1||x b ||000, and A b therefore returns a valid forgery with noticeable probability (if A Comb would succeed with noticeable probability for this case).
In summary, it follows that any successful adversary on the combiner MAC immediately yields successful attacks on both hash functions, proving the claim. ⊓ ⊔
Variations
In this section we briefly deal with some variations of our previous construction.
Reducing the Key Size. To reduce the key size in our construction we may assume that one of the hash functions is a random oracle and has property PRO, and move from strongly preserving combiners to mildly preserving ones. This also shows that such weaker combiners may come with a gain in efficiency. If we assume that one hash function behaves like a random function then, instead of picking the t i 's at random and putting them into the key, we define t has the same length.
If we consider two hash functions with distinct output sizes n 0 and n 1 , then we need to concatenate 5·max{n 0 , n 1 } bits of output. For this we simply concatenate enough hash values H b (1||x b || i ℓ b ) (with increasing counter values i) for ℓ b = ⌈log 2 (5 · max{n 0 , n 1 }/n b )⌉, and truncate longer outputs to 5 · max{n 0 , n 1 } bits. At the same time the t b i 's are also chosen to be of length 5 · max{n 0 , n 1 }. With these modifications all the proofs carry over straightforwardly.
Combining More Hash Functions. To combine h ≥ 3 hash functions, each with output size n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n h−1 , we set again n := max{n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n h−1 } and, this time, produce (2h + 1) · n output bits for each function H prsrv b
. Accordingly, we let the t b i 's be of length (2h + 1) · n. As long as h is polynomial the proofs can be easily transferred to this case.
Alternatively, one can apply our general method to combine three or more hash functions as discussed in Section 5. Yet, this general construction yields a less efficient solution than the tailor-made solution above.
Weak vs. Mild vs. Strong Preservation
The first proposition shows that strong preservation implies mild preservation which, in turn, implies weak preservation. The proof is straightforward and given only for sake of completeness: Proposition 1. Let prop be a set of properties. Then any strongly multi-property preserving combiner for prop is also mildly preserving for prop, and any mildly preserving combiner for prop is also weakly preserving for prop.
Proof. Assume that the combiner is sMPP for prop. Suppose further that prop(C) ⊆ prop such that there is some property P i ∈ prop − prop(C). Then, since the combiner is sMPP, we must also have P i / ∈ prop(H 0 ) ∪ prop(H 1 ), else we derive a contradiction to the strong preservation. We therefore have prop ⊆ prop(H 0 ) ∪ prop(H 1 ), implying mild preservation via the contrapositive statement. Now consider an mMPP combiner and assume prop = prop(H 0 ) or prop = prop(H 1 ). Then, in particular, prop = prop(H 0 ) ∪ prop(H 1 ) and the mMPP property says that also prop = prop(C). This proves sMPP.
⊓ ⊔
To separate the notions we consider the collision-resistance property CR and the property NZ (non-z ero output) that the hash function should return 0 · · · 0 with small probability only. This may be for example required if the hash value should be inverted in a field:
non-zero output (NZ): A hash function H has property NZ if for any efficient adversary A the probability that for H ← HKGen(1 n ) and M ← A(H) we have H(M ) = 0 · · · 0, is negligible.
Lemma 6. Let prop = {CR, NZ} and assume that collision-intractable hash functions exist. Then there is a hash function combiner which is weakly multiproperty perserving for prop, but not mildly multi-property preserving for prop.
Proof. Consider the following combiner (with standard key generation, (H 0 , H 1 ) ← CKGen(1 n ) for H 0 ← HKGen 0 (1 n ) and H 1 ← HKGen 1 (1 n )):
The combiner for input M first checks that the length of M is even, and if so, divides M = L||R into halves L and R, and -checks that H 0 (L) = H 0 (R) if L = R, and that H 0 (M ) = 0 · · · 0, -verifies that H 1 (L) = H 1 (R) if L = R, and that H 1 (M ) = 0 · · · 0. If the length of M is odd or any of the two properties above holds, then the combiner outputs H 0 (M )||H 1 (M ). In any other case, it returns 0 2n .
We first show that the combiner is weakly preserving. For this assume that the hash function H b for b ∈ {0, 1} has both properties. Then the combiner returns the exceptional output 0 2n only with negligible probability, namely, if one finds an input with a non-trivial collision under H b and which also refutes property NZ. In any other case, the combiner's output H 0 (M )||H 1 (M ) inherits the properties CR and NZ from hash function H b .
Next we show that the combiner is not mMPP. Let H
